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The making of statistical inferences in distributional form is concep- 
tionally complicated because the epistemic 'probabilities' assigned are 
mixtures of fact and fiction. In this respect they are essentially different 
from 'physical' or 'frequency-theoretic' probabilities. The distributional 
form is so attractive and useful, however, that it should be pursued. Our 
approach is In line with Walds theory of statistical decision functions 
and with Lehmann's books about hypothesis testing and point estima- 
tion: loss functions are defined, risk functions are studied, unbiasedness 
and equivariance restrictions are made, etc. A central theme is that the 
loss function should be 'proper'. This fundamental concept has been 
explored by meteorologists, psychometrists, Bayesian statisticians, and 
others. The paper should be regarded as an attempt to reconcile various 
schools of statisticians. By accepting what we regard 88 good and useful 
in the various approaches we are trying to develop a nondogmatic 
approach. 
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1hmdUctm ' 0  
The making of statistical inferences is an uncertain affair. That is why different 
schools have emerged and the statistical controversy has appeared. We worry about 
this controversy, because the lack of consensus revealed by it impedes the respectabd- 
ity of our science. It is true that the debate between the various schools is less heated 
than it used to be. The statistical community has started to realize that every school 
has something useful to say and that the making of applications requires an eclectic 
attitude. Some situations are dealt with most appropriately by using a data-analytic 
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approach in which statistical modelling is kept at a minimum. Other situations 
require a Neyman-Pearson test or a p-value. Sometimes a prior distribution can be 
defined and a Bayesian approach is indicated. It is easy to agree with the following 
statement in (EFRON, 1970): 
Both the objective and the subjective schools have attempted to 
broaden the philosophical basis of their respedve models. These 
attempts at greater applicability range from the ingenuous (in his 
lifetime the statistician would err 5% of the time) to the heroic 
(subjective probability). Nevertheless it is a fact of life that in many 
practical situations neither frame is satisfactory. In such situations the 
difficulty in choosing an appropriate loss function is dwarfed by the 
fundamental problem of choosing an applicable framework in which 
to view the experiment and its results. 
Yet, in the present paper, we focus on the problem how, given a probabilistic model 
that describes the experiment, inferences should be made. The reason is that this, and 
not the problem how to select an appropriate model, has received most attention in 
papers about the statistical controversy. 
Suppose that the data x have to be used to discuss the unknown y of interest. We 
assume that (x,  y )  is the outcome of (X, Y), where X and Y are random variables 
taking values in spaces E and 9l respectively. The joint distribution P is assumed to 
belong to some parametrized family B = {Pole E 0) .  Inference about g(O), where g 
is some deterministic function, is a special case of this formulation (identify y and 
g(8) and let Y have the distribution which assigns point mass 1 to y). 
The form of the inference is crucial. We focus on the form of a probability 
distribution on 9. A well-known way to construct such distributional inferences is 
via a Bayesian analysis. If a prior distribution is chosen for 8, the joint distribution 
of 8, X, and Y can be constructed. Next, by the laws of probability, the (marginal) 
conditional distribution of Y given X = x is obtained. This is the Bayesian solution 
w.r.t. the prior T. ‘Fiducial inference’ and ‘structural inference’ are also well-known. 
An introduction to fiducial inference can be found in FISHER (1959) and BUEHLER 
(1 980). Its controversial history is described in SEIDENFELD (1 992) and -ELL (1992). 
The structural approach to distributional inference can be found in FRA~ER (1968). 
The distributional form has been rejected as too ambitious and controversial by the 
‘frequentists’ after they had seen that Fisher made some misinterpretations, for 
example with respect to the Behrens-Fisher problem. It is not difficult, however, to 
realize that alternative forms of inference, e.g. estimates equipped with standard 
errors, are used in practice as if they are distributional inferences. The distributional 
form is attractive as it provides an intrinsic way to express the uncertainties the 
statistician has about y. 
Why are distributional inferences so controversial? The main reason is that the 
‘probability’ distributions assigned are distributions of ‘epistemic’ probabilities which 
describe our ‘knowledge’ about the unknown of interest (epistemology = theory of 
.- 
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knowledge). The distributional inference summarizes the information one has about 
y with no particular application in mind. These epistemic probabilities should not 
be mixed up with ‘physical’ or ‘frequency-theoretic’ probabilities. Epistemic proba- 
bilities are mixtures of fact and fiction. We use the word ‘fact’ to denote those real 
things whose existence and definition one might agree about: the data x, the 
definition of the unknown y about which an inference has to be made, the true, 
usually unknown, distribution which determines the physical probabilities. The word 
‘fiction’ is used to denote the additional inputs the statistician needs to perform his 
tasks. These inputs are not necessarily purely fictive. There may be a factual core. 
Examples are the ‘principles’, ‘loss functions’, ‘prior distributions’, etc. which the 
statistician exploits. 
Of course, if a distributional inference is given about y ,  other probability 
statements can be derived by the calculus of probability. An induced distributional 
inference can immediately be obtained aboutfb) wherefis some mapping. One of 
the major paradigms in Bayesian statistics is that inferential probability statements 
should ‘cohere’ in the sense that for all f such an induced probability distribution 
is ‘inferentially valid’. Lindley writes ‘My thesis is that sampling-theorists have failed 
to consider coherence and, in consequence, have produced unsatisfactory results’, see 
LINDLEY (1990). In our theory it may happen that the inferences obtained for y and 
fb) do not cohere in the sense indicated. As distributional inferences and the 
‘probabilities’ they define are mixtures of fact and fiction there is no compelling 
reason why these probabilities should cohere in the same way physical probabilities 
or relative frequencies do. In fact there is a very good reason why the epistemic 
probabilities should not be subjected to such restrictive framework. This is explained 
in Section 8 and has the consequence that our approach to distributional inference 
is less ‘dogmatic’ than most other approaches. An interesting paper, expressing a 
similar point of view as this paragraph, is WILRINSON (1977). 
The purpose of this paper is to give an introduction to the loss Function approach 
to distributional inference. Hence we will focus on procedures for making distribu- 
tional inferences and we will compare these on the basis of their risk functions. Of 
course the choice of a loss function is a matter of concern. The loss function approach 
to distributional inference is not new. For example, in EATON (1982) the problem of 
evaluating one method of distributional inferences (i.e. using improper prior 
distributions) is treated using a loss function formulation. Philosophy, problem 
formulation and proper loss functions (see the next section) are discussed in the 
introduction to that paper. 
2 Properness 
Our theory of distributional inferences is in line with Wald’s theory of statistical 
decision functions. The set of all probability measures on aY is denoted by aY*. A 
procedure for making distributional inferences is a function Q: %+aY*. A loss 
function L : 3 x 6 * + R  is needed to express the loss incurred if the inference v E 3* 
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is made whereas the true value is equal to y. It is natural to choose the loss function 
such that L(  y, v) 2 0 with equality if and only if v = E ~ .  (Dirac measure E~ assigns 
point mass 1 toy.) There is yet another extremely important property which L should 
satisfy. That is the property of properness. 
D e m o N  1. The loss function L is said to be proper (or Bayes-fair) $9 Y = v I  E g* 
implies 
EL(Y,v2)2EL(Y,vl) for all v * E ~ *  
The underlying idea is obvious: if one would know that y is from distribution v I  then 
it is this distribution which should appear if the expected loss is minimized. In other 
words, the evaluation of the distributional inference should be such that the 
statistician produces the true distribution if this is known. There is an abundance of 
proper loss functions. An example for I = 4 1  is 
U Y ,  v) = (l[u.a)(z) - G(z))2 dz (1) J: 
i 
where v is a probability measure on W and G(.) the corresponding c.d.f. Note that 
lbmm)(z) corresponds with the c.d.f. of E,., and hence LQ, v)  is the squared L,-distance 
between the c.d.f.’s of v and E,,. Properness of this loss function follows from the 
observation that 
EL(Y, v2)= G:(z)(~ -G,(z))+(l -Gz(z)>2Gl(z)dz 
= /(GI (2) - G , ( z ) ) ~  dr + GI (z)( 1 - G, (2)) dz I 
Here Y - v I  and Gi(.) is the c.d.f. of vi, i = 1,2. It can be shown that loss function 
(1) is a so-called ‘quadratic loss function’: under the condition that the first moment 
of v is finite, L(y, v )  is equal to - 112 ff lu - vl(v - &,.)(du)(v - &,.)(dv). The proof 
of this assertion can be found in KROESE (1994). The class of quadratic loss functions 
was introduced for finite I in STABLVON HOLSTEIN et al. (1978) and for arbitrary 9 
in EATON (1982). We think that loss function (1) is attractive, also because 
L ( y ,  8,) = I y - zI for all y and z .  More examples of proper loss functions can be 
found in HENDRICKSON et al. (1971), SAVAGE (1971), SCHERVISH (1989), etc. 
The procedures we will construct will be chosen (partly) on the basis of their risk 
( = expected loss) functions. Such approaches are sometimes called decision-theoretic. 
We do not use this formulation because we insist upon a clear separation between 
statistical inference and decision making. The statistician provides a distributional 
inference about y based on the data x.  This distributional inference describes the 
uncertainty about y after having observed X = x.  The statistician carries the main 
responsibility for making this inference and should be evaluated by a proper loss 
function. Next it will usually be other people who worry about subsequent 
discussions and decisions. 
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The risk function R of a procedure Q is defined as R(8, Q) = EJ.( Y, Q(X) ) .  In 
general no procedure exists of which the risk is uniformly smaller than that of any 
other procedure. One way to solve this problem is to require the risk to be small in 
some overall sense. For example the minimax rule can be chosen or the Bayes rule 
w.r.t. some probability measure T. It is a simple fact, see e.g. BERNARDO (1979), that 
properness of the loss implies that the Bayes risk r ( t ,  Q )  = R(0, Q) dr(8) is 
minimum if Q corresponds, at least formally, with the Bayesian solution (as described 
in the previous section) w.r.t. the prior T. Hence, using a proper loss function has 
the consequence that if a prior distribution is available, based on solid information, 
the Bayesian answer is obtained. If such a prior does not exist, considering the 
integrated risk is less appealing and so is the Bayesian approach. Another possibility 
is to restrict the class of procedures by some requirement. Classical examples are the 
reductions by unbiasedness and equivariance. These will be considered in the 
following sections. 
3 Inference about a success probability 
Suppose that s successes have been observed in a sequence of n independent Bernoulli 
experiments, all with the same unknown success probability p .  So s is the outcome 
of S - B ( n , p ) .  The problem to make a distributional inference about p in this 
situation has received considerable attention in the literature. In his famous 
posthumous essay, Thomas Bayes used an argument that resembles the concept of 
using the U[O, 11 distribution as prior such that the posterior Beta (s + 1, n - s + 1) 
is obtained as distributional inference. Other authors who obtained the same solution 
are Laplace, Pearson, and many others. Some Bayesians advocated the Beta(!, 3 
prior distribution. For a summary of the Bayesian approach to the binomial 
problem, see GEISSER (1984). Fisher had problems in extending his fiducial argument 
to discrete distributions and only provided an asymptotically valid result, see FISHER 
(1959). The same remark applies to Fraser’s structural inference, see FRA~ER (1968). 
Although we do not criticize the solutions above, we like to present an alternative 
approach. In practice the differences will be small. Any procedure 
Q : {0, . . . , n}-+[O, 1]* for making distributional inferences about p is characterized 
by the distribution functions G,(.), s = 0, . . . , n. An appealing property to require of 
such a procedure is that ‘on the average’ equal mass is put to the left and the right 
of the true value. The operationalization of this definition requires that one considers 
the random variable X - B(n, 0) for arbitrary 0 E 8 = (0,l). The notation empha- 
sizes the difference between the random variable S actually realized and the 
theoretical construct X. 
DEFINITION 2. The procedure Q is said to be unbiased if E,Gx(B) = 112 holds for all 
In LEHMANN (1951) a concept of unbiasedness was introduced that depends on the 
loss function of interest. In a decision theoretic setting with loss function L, a 
e E (o,i). 
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procedure d is said to be unbiased if EeL(8, d ( X ) )  5 EeL(B,, d ( X ) )  for all 8,8 ,6  8. 
It can be shown that, except for some complications if 8 is 0 or 1, Definition 2 
corresponds with Lehmann's concept of unbiasedness if loss function (1) is con- 
sidered. The proof is not too interesting and is skipped here. The Bayes-Laplace 
procedure Q(BL) defined by QtBL)(s) = Beta(s + 1 , n - s + 1) with corresponding 
c.d.f.3 G!nL)(.), is not unbiased as it satisfies 
(2) 
where Xand X' are independent and B(n, 8 )  distributed. Formula (2) can be proved 
using the fact that the order statistics of independent uniformly distributed r.v.3 on 
[0, 11 are Beta distributed. 
We use some modification of Fisher's fiducial argument to generate a particular 
unbiased procedure. The idea is that az(s)=Gs(z) expresses the 'weight of the 
evidence' carried by the observation s in favour of H,: p 5 z, the complementary 
weight being assigned to the alternative hypothesis A , : p  > z .  One usually uses the 
p-value P,(X 2 s) or P,(X > s) as the weight in favour of H,. Taking, for z E [0, l), 
the arithmetic average of these two, we obtain 
(3) 
EeGfL)(0)  = i + (0 - i ) P ( X  = X') 
Gt0)(z) = P,(X > S) + fP,(X = S) 
Q(O)(s) = fBeta(s, n - s + 1) + iBeta(s + 1, n - s) 
The corresponding procedure Q(O) is given by 
(4) 
where, by definition, Beta (0,g) =&,, and BetaKO) =el for all f . g  >O. In the 
derivation of (4) a similar argument is used as the verification of (2). The rule Q(O) 
has an interesting optimality property: consider as loss function the following 
obvious modification of (I). 
TI~EOREM 1. The procedure Q(O' is unbiased. It is Bayes-best unbiased in the sense that 
it minimizes the Bayes risk with respect to the unform prior among all unbiased 
procedures, for loss function (5). 
PROOF: See Appendix A. 
Of course the Bayes risk of Q(O) is larger than that of Q(BL), the risk of Q(") not being 
uniformly smaller than that of Q'O). In KROESE (1994) it is proved that Q ( O )  is 
inadmissible and simple procedures are described explicitly that dominate Q ( O )  (for 
sample sizes 1 and 2). The existence of such procedures is no compelling reason for 
rejecting Q(O). These other rules are not unbiased. The unbiasedness results in some 
loss of performance. This is natural if unbiasedness (or equivariance) restrictions are 
made. 
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REMARK. There are other definitions of unbiasedness that can be considered. If a 
distributional inference Q (s),  with distribution function G,(.), has to be used to make 
an estimate of p, then it is natural to consider the expectation of Q ( s )  as the estimate 
of p. The procedure Q is said to be expectation-unbiased if the so defined point 
estimator is unbiased, i.e. 
Note that neither Q(BL) nor Q(O) is expectation-unbiased. The procedure Q defined by 
Q ( s )  = Beta(s, n - s) (with obvious interpretation of the degeneracies), however, is. 
Also for the concept of expectation-unbiasedness results can be derived like that of 
Theorem 1. We refer to KROESE (1994). 
The concept of expectation-unbiasedness has a drawback in comparison with the 
concept of unbiasedness discussed earlier. The drawback is that it depends on the 
parametrization. If log{B/(l - 0) )  is used instead of B then no expectation-unbiased 
procedure Q exists as this function of B does not allow an unbiased estimate. The 
concept of expectation-unbiasedness is of considerable intuitive interest, however, 
especially in those, possibly complicated, situations where one has already con- 
structed a satisfactory unbiased estimator and wants to express the involved certainty 
by replacing the estimator by some procedure for making distributional inferences. 
It is then natural to require that this procedure is expectation-unbiased. 
4 Inference about a location pameter 
Another problem that has received considerable attention in the literature is the 
‘measurement problem’, see for example FRASER (1968). Stripped to its essentials, the 
problem is as follows. Let the error e = x - p in the measurement x of some physical 
constant p E R be regarded as the outcome of a r.v. E having some known continuous 
error distribution with c.d.f. F(.). Hence x is regarded as the outcome of a random 
variable X with distribution function FJ.), where FJz)  = F(r - p). If this model is 
accepted, the random variable X and its probability distribution 9 X  have a clear 
physical and frequency-theoretic interpretation in terms of repeated measurements 
Suppose a distributional inference is required about p on the basis of the data x. 
We assume nothing is known in advance about p. By writing p = x - e it seems 
natural to take Q(’)(x) = 14(x - E )  = 9 ( x  + p - X )  as distributional inference about 
p. ‘As nothing is known about p prior to the experiment, the probability distribution 
of E does not change by the observation of X = x * .  Of course Q(l) (x)  has no 
interpretation in terms of repeated experiments because p is a deterministic constant. 
It is easy to see that the existence of a density F’ =f implies that Q( ‘ ) (x )  has the 
likelihood function f,b) =f(x - I ( )  as its density. So Q‘” corresponds with using 
Lebesgue measure as formal prior distribution for p.Q(” also corresponds with the 
fiducial argument: let Gt)(.) be the c.d.f. corresponding to Q( ‘ ) (x ) .  The continuity of 
of p. 
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F suffices to show that G!)(p)  is identical to the p-value aJx) = P,(X 2 x )  (the 
fiducial argument, compare the previous section). 
The so defined procedure Q(l) is also supported by our loss function approach: 
Q(’) is MRE (Minimum Risk Equivariant) w.r.t. translations if the loss function is 
proper and invariant. A procedure is (translation) equivariant if a shift in the data 
leads to a corresponding shift of the distributional inference. The invariance of the 
loss function means that the loss does not change if the true value y and the 
distributional inference are shifted over the same distance. The precise choice of the 
loss function is not important in the present context because Q(I) is MRE for aery 
proper and invariant loss function (provided its risk is finite). An abundance of such 
loss functions exists, an example is (1). 
The proof that Q(’) is MRE is as follows: the equivuriunce of Q : R+W* implies 
that Q(x)  is obtained from Q(0) by shifting Q(0) over a distance x. The inuuriance 
of L implies that the risk of an equivariant procedure can be written as 
E , J h  €!<XI> =: E L @ -  X, &(ON 
The properness of L implies that the r.h.s. is minimum if Q(0) = go( - X). Hence 
Q ( x )  = U ( x  + p - X) = Q(’)(x). In EATON (1992) the admissibility of Q(’)  is estab- 
lished (under some conditions) for a special class of loss functions. 
5 An example of predictive inference 
It is often argued that prediction should be central in statistics, because predictive 
statements are verifiable. In this respect it is interesting to consider the following 
extension of Section 4. Suppose the measurement x has to be used to make a 
distributional inference about some future measurement y. Here x and y are regarded 
as outcomes of independent random variables X and Y, having distribution functions 
Fl (. - p )  and F2(. - p), respectively. Fl and F2 are regarded as known whereas p E Iw 
is unknown. A review of approaches is as follows: 
(I) As the distribution function F2(. - p )  of Y has a solid physical and frequency-the- 
oretic interpretation, it is natural to require that the distributional inference Q ( x )  
about y has the same form. This implies that the corresponding distribution function 
G,(.) should satisfy G&) = F,(z - f i (x) )  where f i ( x )  is some estimate of p. This 
approach is often followed in practice. It is misleading, though, as Q(x)  should be 
more dispersed than the distribution corresponding with I$(.). The statistical 
uncertainties, arising from the fact that p is unknown, should be ‘added’ to the 
physical uncertainties about the future measurement. If p is replaced by an estimate 
and the resulting distribution is used as distributional inference about y the 
uncertaines are underestimated. 
(II) As the distribution function G,(.) is some kind of estimate of F 2 ( . - p ) ,  
the classical unbiusedness requirement E,G,(z) = F2(z - p ) ,  for all z and p ,  
might be made. If a random variable 2 can be constructed such that (a) 2 and 
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Xare independent, for all p, and (b) Y , ( X  + 2) = 9,, Y, then G,(z) = P(Z s z - X )  
defines the estimate required, because E,G,(z) = E,P((Z S z - X) lX)  = P,(Z + X 
s z )  = P,( Y < z )  = F2(2 - p) .  This approach to distributional inference fails if Y is 
not sufficiently more dispersed than X and consequently such a random variable 2 
does not exist. If Fl = F2 then the unbiased estimator of the distribution function of 
Y corresponds to the Dirac measure ex with mass 1 at the observation X. The 
statistical uncertainties involved in the prediction of y are suppressed rather than 
expressed if this approach is chosen. 
(111) In Section 4 we saw that many approaches lead to U ( x  + p - X) as distribu- 
tional inference about p on the basis of the observation x. A predictive .distribution 
for y can, of course, be obtained by integrating out the conditional distribution of 
Y given p. This will lead to the same inference as the following argument: it is natural 
to write y = x  + (p - x )  + 0, - p )  and to suggest the distributional inference 
Q(l) (x)  = U ( x  + (p - X )  +( Y - p ) )  = U ( x  + ( Y  - X)). Note that the distribution 
of Y - X does not depend on p. 
(IV) The solution obtained under (111) can also be obtained directly in our loss 
function approach. Assuming in Section 4 that the loss function is proper and 
invariant under translations, Q ( l )  is MRE, provided that the risk function is finite. 
Note that the risk 
is minimum if Q(0) = U( Y - X )  and, hence, if Q ( x )  = U ( x  + Y - X). Under some 
conditions, the procedure Q(I) is admissible for a special class of loss functions as is 
demonstrated in EATON (1993). 
6 General MRE procedures 
There are no difficulties in generalizing most of the results of the preceding two 
sections to multidimensional translation problems. In fact, the MRE results can be 
generalized to (parametric) models, invariant under groups other than the translation 
group. If there exists a ‘sufficiently large’ group that leaves the model invariant and, 
moreover, a proper and invariant loss function exists, then in general the MRE 
procedure can be found. It does not depend on which particular loss function is 
chosen. We will not make this more concrete here; the details can be found in KROESE 
(1994). It is interesting that the MRE.procedure, if it exists, corresponds to Fraser’s 
structural inference or, equivalently, to the formal Bayes rule if the right Haar 
measure is used to construct a prior. So at least in the case where there is sufficient 
invariance, various approaches lead to the same distributional inference. This 
inference therefore comes close to ‘inductive logic’. The MRE rule may be inadmis- 
sible unfortunately. An easy example is as follows: 
EXAMPLE 1. Suppose the outcome x of X - N,@, I,,) has to be used to make 
Q VVS. 1995 
72 A. H. Kroese et el. 
a distributional inference Q(x)  about p, where p 1 3 .  Consider the loss 
function 
,qe, v) = -iogj(e) (6) 
wheref-dv/dd is the density of v with respect to Lebesgue measure on W. Loss 
function (6) is proper, see BERNARDO (1979), and translation invariant. Hence, by an 
argument like that in Section 4, the procedure Q, defined by Q(x) = N,(x, I,), is 
MRE w.r.t. this loss function. In STEIN (1955) it was shown that estimators d: RP+W 
exist such that 
E, IIm7 - P 1: < E# IIX - Ir 1: 
holds for all p E UP: Now we compare the risk of Q with that of Q’ defined by 
Q’ (x )  = N,(d(x), I,). The risk of Q’ is equal to 
E,LOI, QW) =E,[-lOg((2x)-”’ex~(-f IIP - dW)II:)ll 
= i n  log 2x +fE#I (d (X) -pII :  
and it is immediately clear that this is uniformly less than the (constant) risk of the 
MRE rule Q which, as a consequence, is inadmissible if logarithmic loss is considered. 
Hence, exactly as in point estimation, an MRE procedure is not necessarily 
admissible. A similar result, for other loss functions, can be found in EATON (1982). 
A second complication is that a proper and invariant loss function does not always 
exist. An example is given in the next section. 
7 Student’s problem 
Section 4 deals with inference about p in the case of a prescribed error distribution. 
A more difficult and possibly more realistic context is that where the error 
distribution is known up to a scale parameter. We will focus on the case where 
normality assumptions are made. It is not difficult to extend the argument to a 
general location-scale family, but the normal case is of crucial interest. 
Suppose that the outcome (x ,  , . . . , x,,) of an independent random sample from 
N ( p , o z )  has to be used to make a distributional inference about p, while c is 
unknown. The problem is invariant under affine transformations, as 
(ax, + b, . . . , ax, + b) can be regarded as a random sample from N(up + b, d o 2 )  for 
all (u,6) c W+ x R. It is natural to choose a loss function L : W x R*+R that is 
proper and invariant under f i n e  transformations. That is, to choose the loss 
function such that the loss does not change if the true value p and the distributional 
inference are shifted and rescaled in the same way. It can be proved, however, that 
no ‘satisfactory’ such loss functions exist, see KROFSE (1994). Here ‘satisfactory’ 
means that the risk of the best equivariant rule is finite and that the loss function 
is not constant. An attractive approach now is to focus on the (translation invariant) 
loss function (1). If the attention is restricted to the affine equivariant procedures, 
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the procedure that uniformly minimizes the risk function can be found. In 
Appendix B it is proved that this is procedure Q(’) defined by 
where T, is a random variable with the Student t-distribution with n degrees of 
freedom. The ‘standard‘ procedure Q(’), defined by 
is also affine equivariant. Therefore standard Student inference is not admissible 
w.r.t. loss function (1). It is of some interest to allow the loss function to depend on 
6. If for example the loss function L({  p ,  a}, v )  = -logy@) - log (a) is chosen where 
f is the density of v ,  then Q(’)  is best affine equivariant and Q(’) thus not admissible 
(see Appendix B). We prefer the first approach, because we do not like the loss 
function to depend on u. The evaluation of a distributional inference will in practice 
be performed on the basis of p and Q only. 
8 Coherency? 
Facing uncertainty, it is natural not to know exactly what to do. The statistician can 
follow some precise procedure but he will always worry about whether this is 
reasonable. We quote from SAVAGE (1 977): 
A more serious difficulty with our exploitation of personal prob- 
ability is this. Perhaps we are too far, in our capacities, from the ideally 
coherent man to benefit always by emulating him. Unlike him, we are 
the victims of vagueness and of relative inability to count and calculate. 
Indeed, were it not for this human weakness, the theory of personal 
probability would have no human use. Yet, since we are imperfect, we 
might conceivably be led sysematically astray in trying to emulate 
perfection. 
The ‘ideally coherent man’ or ‘rational decision maker’ some Bayesians and 
philosophers discuss is an idealized person who is coherent in the very narrow 
probubifistic sense that the probabilities assigned by him comply with each.other: if 
a distributional inference Q(x)  is provided about an unknown y then for him this 
defines a distributional inference about z =f(y) for all mappings I. 
Though we like to apply probabilistic coherency as a ‘principle’ (see Section 9), 
we reject it as a ‘dogma’ because it is an example of what Whitehead has called ‘a 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness’. Epistemic probabilities are mixtures of fact and 
fiction and there is a good scientific reason why distributional inference should not 
be required to cohere in the restrictive sense described above. The fictions (e.g. prior 
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distributions and loss functions) most appropriate for one situation are not necess- 
arily in line with the fictions needed in another situation. It is too restrictive to require 
that always the same fiction should do. Note that this is also exemplified in the 
Bayesian literature. If one is interested in testing a point null hypothesis H : 8 = Boy 
a prior is used that assigns positive mass to e, see for example BERGER (1985). If 
a different testing problem is considered a different prior is chosen. In our loss 
function formulation it is possible that a procedure Q for making distributional 
inferences about y has some optimality property (for example it can be MRE, 
Bayes-best unbiased, minimax), while the induced procedure forf ( y) does not have 
this optimality property. Examples will be given in the following sections. 
In WILKINSON (1 977) ‘empirical evidence’ is given for noncoherence as an intrinsic 
property of observational data. For example, suppose that the outcome x of a random 
variable X - N,(B, I,) has been observed. Here NJ8, I,) denotes the p-dimensional 
normal distribution with mean 8 and the identity matrix as covariance matrix. Many 
will agree that Q(x) = N,(x, Z,) is the ‘correct’ distributional inference about 8. The 
induced distributional inference about 118 112, however, is very unattractive, see Section 
3.5 in Wilkinson’s paper. Note that the expectation of this induced distributional 
inference isp + 1 1 ~ 1 1 ~ ~  while 11X112 has a noncentral x 2  distribution with meanp + lle11*. 
Giving up the principle of probabilistic coherence leads to ad hockery which is 
unpleasant but not unrealistic. One starts to understand what Neyman meant by his 
‘Life is complicated but not uninteresting’. He wanted to develop a nondogmatic 
approach to statistics and that is what we want too. In the following sections the 
question of coherency will be central. 
9 Multiple hypothesis testing 
Suppose that an acceptable, e.g. MRE, rule Q(’) is available for making distributional 
inferences about y, whereas the genuine interest is not in y itself but in ‘its group 
membership’ or, equivalently, in the truth or falsity of corresponding hypotheses H, 
( i  = 1, . . . , m). To be precise, suppose that W = QI + - - - + qm is some partitioning 
of the space Q of all theoretically possible y values. We are interested in the 
hypotheses H,: y E aYi ( i  = 1, . . . , m). One of these must be true, but which one? 
Instead of giving a multiple-decision formulation directly, we can make a dis- 
tributional inference about i = ib), where i : q+{ 1, . . . , m }  is the indicator of the 
hypothesis which is true. So we are looking for a reasonable procedure 
Q : S+{ 1, . . . , m}*. Such a procedure Q can be obtained by ‘projecting’ Q“): define 
@I) by 
(7) 
Note that @l)(x) = Q(I)(x) 0 i- I .  One should not be misled by these formal niceties. 
The problem of making a distributional inference about i requires the formulation 
of a loss function L(i, v ) ,  where v is now a probability measure on { 1, . . . , m},  and 
of a couple of principles which are not necessarily in line with those behind the 
construction of Q(”. Much will depend on the specific application in mind but the 
Q(l)(x> = (Q(’)(x)(~I),  * * . 3 Q‘”(x>(@‘m)) 
0 VVS. 1995 
Distributional inference 75 
properness of L is crucial. In the references of Section 2 an abundance of proper loss 
functions for this problem can be found. Very well-known is the 'Brier score' 
introduced in BRIER (1950): 
(8) 
where e, is the ith unit vector and q is the vector of probabilities assigned by v. If 
the classes are ordered, the 'Ranked Probability Score' introduced in EPSTEIN (1969) 
can be considered. Loss function (1) is a generalization of this Ranked Probability 
Score. 
Whether or not the procedure $(I) defined in (7) is most attractive, it certainly is 
a convenient and natural rule. Having specified an epistemic probability distribution 
&(x), for example @(x), on ( 1 , .  . . , m], immediate applications can be made 
to multiple-decision problems: suppose the space d = {al, . . , , a,,) consists of a 
finite number of actions, usually statements about the truth or falsity of various 
combinations of HI,. . ., H,,, . The loss function L, given by 
U i ,  v )  = ller - 411: 
L(Y,  aj) = wij 
if y E I, (i = 1,. . . , m; j = 1,.  . . , n), is constant on the various subsets of I or, 
equivalently, the loss depends on y via the group-membership variable i = i ( y ) .  
In SCHAAFSMA (1969) such formulations were considered and it was established 
that Wald's minimax risk principle leads to degenerate results in the sense that, in 
the classical setting where y = t (the true value of a parameter), least favourable 
distributions tend to concentrate on 'the common boundary'. A natural way out of 
these difficulties is to abandon the minimax principle and to proceed along the lines 
of the present section by taking the action uj which minimizes the expected loss 
wijQ(x)({ i ) )  
I =  I 
with respect to the epistemic probabilities suggested. If &(I)  is chosen, probabilisti- 
cally coherent results are obtained. This should, however, not obscure the fact that 
these special-purpose interpretations of Q(' )  are not necessarily optimal. For example, 
in many probability models the MRE rule Q ( l )  is minimax, see KIEFER (1957). The 
corresponding multiple-decision rule, however, will usually neither be MRE nor 
minimax. 
A referee noticed the following: suppose a distributional inference Q(')(x) is 
obtained about y by using the Bayes rule w.r.t. a probability measure T and a proper 
loss function. A distributional inference about i ( y )  can be obtained by projecting 
Q(')(x). If the loss function for the problem of making a distributional inference 
about i ( y )  is proper, for example if loss function (8) is used, then this induced 
distributional inference corresponds to the Bayes rule w.r.t. T in this problem. Hence 
considering Bayes rules w.r.t. a fixed prior distribution leads to probabilistically 
coherent inferences, in the sense that induced/projected distributional inferences are 
inferentially valid. A similar observation was made in EATON (1982). It is not clear, 
however, that the same prior distribution is appealing if we are interested in different 
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aspects of y. In fact it is obvious that it isn't, at least not if the aspects are sufficiently 
different. We think that the prior should depend to some extent on the aspect of y 
of interest. In that case the probabilistic coherence of the inferential statements is lost, 
but increased relevance is gained. An extreme example is that where we are interested 
in testing a point null hypothesis. This will be considered in the next section. 
c 0 1 
C 1 0 
10 Classical hypothesis testing 
It is interesting to specialize Section 9 to the case where m = 2 and y = r is the true 
vaIue of the underlying parameter. We shaI1 present an example where the sugges- 
tions of Section 9 work out nicely and another one where the principle of 
probabilistic coherency has to be abandoned because it leads to something com- 
pletely unacceptable. The two hypotheses HI and H2 involved will now be denoted 
as 'the' hypothesis H (=HI) and its negation A (=IT2) .  
To be precise, let x be the outcome of a random variable X whose distribution 
P = 9 ( X )  on the sample space % is assumed to be in the family B = { P o ;  6 E 0) such 
that the true value t of i3 can be defined by P = P,. We consider the dichotomy 
0 = 0" + $ A  and we are interested in the truth or falsity of the hypotheses H: t E 0, 
and A : t I Q A .  Suppose we have to make a choice from 
4: no sufficient evidence for deciding between H and A, 
aH: H is accepted and A is rejected. 
aA: A is accepted and H is rejected. 
where c is (much) smaller than 1/2. 
EXAMPLE 2. Consider the context of Section 4 and suppose that one is interested in 
the question whether H: p (  = t )  < 0 or A : p (  = t )  > 0, the possibility of p( = r )  = 0 
being ignorable. Section 4 and Section 9 suggest to proceed as follows: first, Q(I) is 
defined by Q(')(x)= U ( x  + p  - X )  with corresponding c.d.f. Glf)(.) defined by 
G$')(2) = 1 - F(x - 2). Secondly, Q ( l )  is determined by the epistemic probabilities 
Q"'(x) = 
(Q(')(x)(Q,), Q( ' ) (x ) (Q , ) )  = (G!i')(O), 1 - G!)(O)) = (1 - F(x),  F(x))  
Thirdly the action that has to be chosen is determined by minimizing the (epistem- 
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ically) expected loss, which equals c if a,, F ( x )  if a”, and 1 - F ( x )  if uA is chosen. 
In this way we obtain the three-decision rule 
a, if x < P-’(c) 
d(x)=  a, if F - ’ ( c ) s x  s F - I ( l  - c )  I if F-’(I - C) < x 
These procedures Q(’), @’), and dare very satisfactory in the sense that they are nicely 
probabilistically coherent. Q(’) is MRE, @ I )  has minimum integrated risk, if finite, 
w.r.t. Lebesgue measure for proper loss functions, and d minimizes the integrated 
risk, if finite, w.r.t. Lebesgue measure for loss function L,. 
EXAMPLE 3. Consider the context of Section 4 and suppose that one is interested in 
the question whether the (point null) hypothesis H: p = 0 is true or its negation 
A : p # 0. Now the requirement of probabilistic coherency leads us nowhere because 
Q(’)(x)(@,) = 0 and d(x)  = a, for all x E 9“. As was said before, in some Bayesian 
literature the prior is adapted to the null hypothesis of interest, see for example 
BERGER (1985). 
The standard frequentist approach to this problem is to compute the ‘exceedance 
probability’ which, in the present context, can be identified as a ( x )  = 2 min 
{ 1 - F(x),  F(x)} .  A procedure Q can be defined by Q ( x )  = (a@), 1 - a(x)) .  In the 
recent literature (HWANG et al., 1992, VAN DER MEW, 1992, VAN DER MEU~EN 
et al., 1993, SCHAAFSMA, 1989, SCHAAFSMA et al., 1989) attempts are made to embed 
such ‘p-values’ a ( x )  in a theory which focuses on ‘the intrinsic meaning’ of the 
procedure a :  %+[O, I], which is that it should ‘approximate the ideal value’ which 
is 1 if H is true and 0 if H is false. The idea is that the procedure a : S+[O, 11 should 
be regarded as an estimator of the true value l(ol(p) of the indicator function 
corresponding to the hypothesis H. Compliance with the Bayesian approach requires 
that this procedure should be evaluated on the basis of a proper loss function, for 
example squared error loss. If one studies the risk function w.r.t. squared error loss, 
i.e. 
R b ,  = q(l(o)(p)  - .(X>)* 
as a function of p, then a discontinuity appears at 0 unless the estimator a: %+to, 11 
satisfies 
Eoa(X> = f 
This is obvious because R(p,  a )  can be decomposed into the variance of a ( X )  which 
is a continuous function of p and the squared bias which is equal to (1 - &a(X))’ 
if p = 0 and E,aZ(X) if p # 0. Theory has been developed (see for instance, VAN DER 
MEULEN et al., 1993) for minimizing certain expressions, e.g. integrated risks, under 
the restriction that the estimator a:  9”+ [0, 13 is ‘similar’, i.e. that Eoa(X) = 1/2. 
Further motivation for this and other concepts of similarity can be found in the paper 
cited above, If the theory is applied to the present example where P is the standard 
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normal distribution, and the integrated mean squared error Rh, a )  dp is minimized 
among all procedures satisfying Eoa(X) = 1/2, then the estimator 
e-312 
a ( x )  = 7 
is obtained, see SCHAAFSMA (1989). Note that this ‘weight of evidence’ can immedi- 
ately be applied to the three-decision problem formulated. It is natural to expect that 
the ‘similarity’ or ‘continuowrisk’ requirement involved in the construction of a 
makes it inadmissible. The conjecture is true. An alternative estimator a’ has 
explicitly been constructed by J. Tolboom (personal communication, 1988) such that 
R(p, a’) c RU, a )  holds for all p. 
11 Mscpssion 
There are many papers and books about the statistical controversy. An interesting 
survey is WILKINSON (1977). The summary of that paper contains the following 
statement: 
One key to resolving the conflict lies in recognizing that inferential probability 
derived from observational data is inherently noncoherent in the sense that their 
inferential implications cannot be represented by a single probability distribution on 
the parameter space. . . 
Noncoherence is mathematically inherent in confidence and fiducial theory, and 
provides a basis for reconciling the Fisherian and Neyman-Pearson viewpoints. A 
unified theory of confidence-based inferential probability is presented, and the 
fundamental incompatibility of this with Subjective Bayesian theory is discussed. 
Our conclusions are only slightly different. The loss function approach we 
recommend, does not exclude any type of approach. The statistical controversy will 
never be resolved unless we agree that there are many ways to argue from the 
observation x to a distributional inference Q(x)  about the true value y of the 
unknown concerned. The different approaches can be compared on the basis of a 
(proper) loss function. Sometimes ‘optimum’ procedures for making distributional 
inferences can be found. Replacing the criterion by another one, though, will usually 
lead to another procedure being ‘optimal’. 
Also the statisical model will always be doubtful, not only because the true 
distribution P m a y  be outside the class B = {Pel 8 E @), but especially because the 
model chosen is only one from a family of 9’s satisfying P E P. There is considerable 
fiction involved in everything and that is why nobody can be sure. Except for this, 
many models do not allow the construction of an ‘optimum’ procedure. In that case 
some ‘reasonable’ procedure has to be found. 
All this does not imply that the making of distributional inferences is useless or 
‘too ambitious’. It simply means that difficulties and responsibilities are involved in 
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making such inferences. We, statisticians, have to train ourselves in resolving these 
difficulties. 
Appendix A (Proof of the theorem in Section 3) 
It is easy to see that Q(O) is unbiased: let Xand X' be independent B(n, 0) distributed 
random variables. Formula (3) implies that 
EeGf'(8) = Po(X > X') + 4 Pe(X = X') = f 
for all 8 E (0,l). It remains to be proved that Q(O) minimizes the integrated risk w.r.t. 
the uniform prior and loss function (5) among all unbiased procedures. 
Let as before G!BL)(.) denote the distribution function of the Beta (s + 1, n - s + 1) 
distribution. The latter is the posterior distribution of 8 if U[O, 13 is used as prior and 
s is observed. Let m(s) denote the corresponding marginal probability that X = s. 
Hence m(s)  = l/(n + 1). For an arbitrary unbiased procedure Q, that generates 
inferences Q(s)  with corresponding c.d.f.3 Gs(.), we can write 
[G$'")(z)(l - G,(z))' + (1 - G!BL)(z))Gf(z)]m(s)J dz =I' KO 
where c : [0, I]+R is arbitrary. The last equality follows from 
n C pZ(X=s)( l -  G,(z))'-P,(X = s ) G f ( ~ ) = ( l  -2EZGx(z)) = O  
s = O  
for all z E (0,l). Here we make use of the assumption that Q is unbiased. If a function 
c can be found such that 
C(Z)P,(X = s) 
m(s)  
G!O)(Z) = GsBL)(z) + (9) 
for all s and z, we have finished the proof. This follows from the fact that for all 
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p E [ O ,  1) the expression p(1 -q)'+ (1 -p)q2  is minimum, as a function of q, for 
q =p. Now observe that for all s and z we have 
= PAX > s) + (2 + c(z)(n + 1))PJX = s) 
Here Beta/,(.) is the c.d.f. of a Beta distribution with parametersfand g. If we choose 
c(z) = (1/2 - z)/(n + I), for all z, then (9) holds and thus the theorem is proved. 
Appendix B (Proof of the assertions of Section 7) 
Suppose (xI, .. . XJ is the outcome of an independent random sample from 
N( p, ~ 3 .  A distributional inference is required about p while crz is unknown. By 
sufficiency, this inference should only depend on (2, s), where 
Note that the natural ordering of procedures is the same for loss functions (1) and 
(10). The problem with loss function (10) is invariant under affine transformations, 
i.e. under the group 59 = R+ x R with actions 
k , , g z ) o ( ~ , ~ ) = k l ~  +g,,g,s) 
k l , g Z ) ~ ~ ( P ~ ~ ) = k l ~  +g,,g10) 
k1,gz)O~ =gz+g,v 
Here 0 denotes group action. The invariance of L,, is easily verified. Note that is 
not proper, properness meaning that the expected loss, w.r.t. some joint distribution 
for p and 0, is minimum for the corresponding marginal distribution of p ,  A 
procedure Q, only depending on ( 2 , s ) ,  is equivariant iff it is of the form 
Q(2, s) = R + mo, where vo is some probability distribution on R not depending on 
(ZY s). Let Q be the equivariant procedure that corresponds with v, in this way and 
let G(.) denote the c.d.f. of vo. The risk of Q can be written as 
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= ( E k U z  :)G'(r) - 2(E,' _s d
We see that the risk is minimum for G(O)(.) defined by 
S 
E&d ; I[o( - X)/S.rn) (2) 
S G(')(z) = 
E&UZ - 
t7 
A routine calculation shows that G(')(.) is the cumulative distribution function 
belonging to the distribution of ,/- Tn, where T,, has the Student t-distri- 
bution with n degrees of freedom. Hence the best equivariant procedure Q ( O )  is given 
by 
It follows that Q(')  is inadmissible w.r.t. loss function (10) and thus w.r.t. loss 
function (1). 
The best equivariant rule can also be calculated w.r.t. loss function L given by 
U{PY 4, v )  = --ogf(P) - 1% (a) (12) 
This loss function is proper, in the above described sense that the expected loss w.r.t. 
a joint distribution for p and d is minimum for the corresponding marginal 
distribution of p. Loss function (12) is also invariant under 3. Now (1 1) immediately 
implies that the optimal vo is equal to 9,,,,@ - a/& which is equal to YT,,- I I,/.. 
This implies that Q(*) is the best equivariant rule w.r.t. loss function (12) and hence 
Q(') not admissible. 
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